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Abstract 
This thesis begins with a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal 
defamation cases. A discussion of the historical protections for anonymous speech 
follows, providing a foundation for the discussion of anonymous speech online. This 
paper examines multiple cases to establish the judicial standards that courts have 
developed to determine whether to unmask the identity of anonymous commenters 
online. A case study of the recent Yelp decision follows, highlighting the incongruity 
with these various standards. Next, an in-depth examination of James Carey’s models of 
communication and the theoretical justifications for protecting anonymous and harmful 
speech explains the need for a national unmasking standard. To conclude, the thesis 
proposes an unmasking law that comports with First Amendment protections of speech 
and societal interest in punishing harmful speakers for their misdeeds.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
What happens when negative reviews appear to correspond with a drop in 
revenue? For Joe Hadeed, owner of Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, it meant it was time to sue 
the commenters who left the negative reviews of his business.1 Over the course of a few 
weeks in 2012, a long sequence of negative reviews caused Hadeed’s rating on the 
popular review site Yelp to plummet. According to Hadeed, following the string of 
unfavorable comments, business dropped by 30% and revenue dropped from $12 
million in 2011 to $9.5 million in 2012, which caused Hadeed to lay off 80 workers and 
sell six trucks.2  
 Hadeed sued Yelp in July 2012, asserting his company had been defamed 
because the reviewing customers could not be matched to the company’s records, which 
included “time, location, and sales data.”3 Yelp refused to hand over the identifying 
information of the commenters, but Virginia’s trial and intermediate appellate courts 
agreed with Hadeed and held Yelp in contempt.4 In January 2014, Yelp appealed to the 
Virginia Supreme Court, asserting that Hadeed had not adequately proved the 
statements were defamatory.5 
                                                 
1
 Angus Loten, Yelp Reviews Brew a Fight Over Free Speech vs. Fairness: Many Businesses Say 
Anonymity of Comments Is Unfair, Sue to Unmask Users, WALL ST. J., (New York) Apr. 2, 2014, at A1, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303847804579477633444768964.  
2
 Jillian D’Onfro, Yelp Is In Court Deal With Free Speech Issues Yet Again, BUS. INSIDER, Apr. 4, 2014, 
available at http://www.businessinsider.com/yelp-free-speech-defamation-2014-4. 
3
 Id. 
4
 Loten, supra note 1.  
5
 D’Onfro, supra note 2.  
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More and more frequently, businesses are claiming they need protection from 
false and defamatory postings, often referred to as “revenge reviews,”6 on websites like 
Yelp. Yelp, on the other hand, claims the reviews are protected by the First Amendment 
and has hired a lobbyist7 to support a federal Anti-SLAPP law.8 Anti-SLAPP laws try to 
prevent powerful plaintiffs from filing unsubstantiated claims against detractors in an 
effort to silence their speech. 9 Plaintiffs may use costly court fees to threaten 
defendants with financial hardship when they disagree with the views that are 
expressed.10  
Yelp launched in 2004 as a way for consumers “to connect with great local 
businesses.”11 It offers a review system that relies on patrons to rate establishments they 
frequent. Yelp is one of many online rating and reviewing sites, and it had 120 million 
unique visitors per month in the last three months of 2013.12  The company states that 
most of its reviews praise good businesses, but that it encourages negative reviews as 
long as they are honest.13 In its Terms of Use, Yelp asks reviewers to share their 
personal experiences and not those of a third party because the company remains 
                                                 
6
 A revenge review is a blistering assessment written by a miffed customer or disgruntled former 
employee. Kim Arlington, ACCC calls for regulation of user-generated restaurant reviews, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD, Apr. 26, 2014, available at http://www.smh.com.au/national/accc-calls-for-
regulation-of-usergenerated-restaurant-reviews-20140425-379py.html.  
7
 Loten, supra note 1. 
8
 A SLAPP suit, or a “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation,” seeks to punish those who speak 
out. George W. Pring, who coined the term, states that SLAPPS aim to punish speakers, “SLAPPs send a 
clear message: that there is a ‘price’ for speaking out politically. The price is a multimillion-dollar lawsuit 
and the expenses, lost resources, and emotional stress such litigation brings.” George W. Pring, SLAPPs: 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 4-6 (1989). 
9
 Kathryn W. Tate, California's Anti-Slapp Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary on Its Operation 
and Scope, 33 LOY  L.A. L. REV. 801, 802 (2000). 
10
 Sean P. Trende, Defamation, Anti-SLAPP Legislation, and the Blogosphere: New Solutions for an Old 
Problem, 44 DUQ. L. REV. 607, 609 (2005-2006).  
11
 Yelp.com, About Us, available at http://www.yelp.com/about. 
12
 Id. 
13
 Yelp.com, User  Reviews, available at http://www.yelp.com/faq#what_is_yelp. 
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neutral in review disputes. Yelp asserts that it expects reviewers to “stand behind your 
review.”14  
In recent years, various claims for defamation against users of Yelp and similar 
websites have surfaced because business owners were not pleased with some of the 
reviews.15 When a court finds that a reviewer was merely expressing an opinion rather 
than a false assertion of fact, the speech is generally protected because under the First 
Amendment, “there is no such thing as a false idea.”16 For example, in Minnesota, a 
man used various doctor-review websites to complain about the physician who treated 
his father.17 In his suit, the doctor stated that these claims were defamatory, including a 
statement where the reviewer calls the doctor a “real tool.”18 The doctor did not win the 
case because the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that calling someone a “tool” 
was an expression of opinion and not a statement of fact.19  
As mentioned earlier, many businesses revile Yelp and believe the website 
provides a breeding ground for unwarranted disparagement and harassment. Studies 
have shown that small businesses have more to gain from Yelp reviews, so it follows 
they likely also have more to lose.20 Some small businesses have filed complaints with 
                                                 
14
 Yelp.com, Content Guidelines, available at http://www.yelp.com/guidelines. 
15
 Angus Loten, Yelp's Deal With Yahoo Has Small Businesses Crying Foul: Entrepreneurs Complain 
That Years of Good Reviews Are Being Sent to the Trash, WALL ST. J. Apr. 9, 2014, at B1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304819004579489451327998582.  
16
 Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
17
 McKee v. Laurion, 825 NW 2d 725, 728 (2013). 
18
 Id. at 729.  
19
 Id. at 733. 
20
 Lee Schafer, Editorial, Schafer: Yelp fosters suspicion among small businesses, STAR TRIBUNE 
(Minneapolis), Apr. 16, 2014, available at http://www.startribune.com/business/255428021.html.  
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the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) asserting that Yelp’s algorithm unfairly targets 
businesses who do not buy advertising by highlighting negative reviews.21  
Of course, Yelp denies these claims and asserts that marketing personnel do not 
have access to the algorithm.22 Yelp also notes that businesses are free to set up an 
account and “claim” their page.23 Claiming a page allows an establishment to monitor 
its reviews and to dialogue with reviewers both publically and privately. Opening an 
account is an easy way for businesses to defend themselves against negative reviews on 
the very same platform that the negative reviews surface.24 Businesses can also be 
proactive and ask satisfied regular patrons to review them on Yelp.25 
Disgruntled business owners have little recourse against Yelp unless they can 
prove that the website itself is actively violating the law.26 Though some businesses 
have tried to hurt Yelp by filing complaints with the FTC, unless they can prove that 
Yelp is contributing to unprotected speech, the businesses are out of luck.27 Section 230 
of the Communications Decency Act protects Yelp; the Good Samaritan provision 
immunizes interactive computer services who publish third-party content.28 This means 
that businesses receiving negative reviews cannot hold Yelp legally liable for the 
comments.29 Instead, the businesses must target the individual reviewers if they wish to 
                                                 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Yelp.com, What is Yelp, available at https://biz.yelp.com/support/what_is_yelp.  
24
 Schafer, supra note 18. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Zeran v. American Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (1997). 
27
 Fair Housing Coun., San Fernando v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (2008). 
28
 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
29
 Id. 
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recover damages.30 According to the Wall Street Journal, Yelp receives an average of 
six subpoenas a month, and many of them are linked to civil lawsuits.31  
Hadeed Carpet Cleaning’s lawsuit against Yelp sought to unmask a handful of 
anonymous reviewers whom the business sought to sue for defamation based on their 
disparaging comments.32 Based on Virginia’s unique unmasking law for anonymous 
speech online, the Virginia appellate court applied a six-part test and found that Hadeed 
was entitled to discover the identities of the commenters because the comments did not 
match up with Hadeed’s business records.33  
Though Yelp and other amici asked the court to apply more stringent tests used 
by other jurisdictions, the court declined to do so.34 As of 2010, more than 20 courts 
have used a variety of unmasking standards across the nation.35 Nearly all of these 
standards attempt to balance the First Amendment rights of speakers against the need 
for plaintiffs to uncover identities to remedy injury caused by defamatory speech 
online.36 Many courts recognize that the law must balance the need to protect reputation 
with freedom of expression, but how to strike that balance is a subject of great debate.37  
Some tests create a very low burden of proof for plaintiffs who wish to unmask 
anonymous speakers. In these instances, plaintiffs need only show they have a sincere 
                                                 
30
 Id. 
31
 Angus Loten, Yelp Regularly Gets Subpoenas About Users FTC Says It Has Received 2,046 
Complaints Since 2008, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2014, at A1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303847804579477644289822928. 
32
 Yelp Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning Inc., 2014 VA. APP. LEXIS 1 (2014). 
33
 Id. at 35. 
34
 Id. at 32.  
35
 M. Mazzotta, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on Standards for Unmasking Anonymous Internet 
Speakers, 51 B. C. L. REV. 833, 846 (2010). 
36
 Erik P. Lewis, Unmasking “Anon12345”: Applying an Appropriate Standard When Private Citizens 
Seek the Identity of Anonymous Defamation Defendants, U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 948 (2009). 
37
 Id. at 954. 
  6 
motive for requesting the information.38 Other tests make it more difficult for plaintiffs 
to unmask anonymous speakers, requiring that plaintiffs provide sufficient evidence to 
suggest they could prevail in court under current laws.39 In the case of defamation, this 
often means proving actual harm.40  
Anonymous online speech is difficult to temper because the Court has granted 
full First Amendment protection to speech on the Internet.41 Though Congress 
attempted to restrict online speech, the U.S. Supreme Court has generally frowned upon 
regulation.42 Cyberspace problems must employ remedial methods that do not restrict 
speech but instead rely on post-publication punishment.  
 Because the Internet is not geographically constrained, jurisdictional issues 
arise more frequently between parties who reside in different states.43 The Internet 
allows someone who lives in New Jersey to comment on an individual or business in 
Florida. If New Jersey has a different unmasking standard than Florida, the legal dispute 
may be drawn out as the parties argue over which unmasking law should apply.44 
Varying unmasking standards are also likely to result in a chilling effect on speech,45 
                                                 
38
 Id. at 957. 
39
  Jason M. Shepard & Genelle Belmas, Anonymity, Disclosure and First Amendment Balancing in the 
Internet Era: Developments in Libel, Copyright, and Election Speech, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 92, 111 
(2012). 
40
 Gertz, supra note 16 at 350. 
41
 Reno v. ACLU, 521 US 844, 869-70 (1997). 
42
 Id. at 882; Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
43
 Scott T. Jansen, Oh What a Tangled Web…The Continuing Evolution of Personal Jurisdiction Derived 
from Internet-Based Contacts, 71 MO. L. REV. 177, 178 (2006).  
44
 Id. at 180-81. 
45
 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960). 
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meaning important information may not be communicated.46 This raises significant 
First Amendment concerns. 
In addition, it also raises certain Due Process issues under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.47 “The fundamental principle of the Supreme Court’s Due Process 
jurisprudence has been that the actor must be able to structure his primary conduct so as 
to avoid liability in a given jurisdiction.”48 Differing unmasking standards render it 
virtually impossible for users to “structure” their “conduct” to avoid unmasking.  
The myriad tests and interpretations of the standards for unmasking anonymous 
speech muddle the law. A national unmasking standard would rectify a serious problem 
facing online speech today: when and how to go about unmasking anonymous 
commenters. A proper unmasking standard must justly weigh the competing interests 
between reputation and free speech. Though a national standard is gravely needed, a 
standard that is too lax in protecting First Amendment freedoms is a likely greater ill 
than foggy unmasking law because the right to anonymous speech, though not absolute, 
is fundamental to freedom of expression.49 For example, it should not be seen as a right 
to harm another’s reputation with false statements of fact. Therefore, courts must 
balance the societal interests in punishing those who engage in harmful speech against 
the First Amendment value of that speech.  
Anonymous speech online raises a number of important questions that this thesis 
seeks to address: 
                                                 
46
 Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent, 70 (2d ed.2005). 
47
 Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in a World Without Borders, 1 VA. J. L. & TECH. 3, 26 (1997). 
48
 Id. at 50.  
49
 Talley, supra note 45 at 64-5.  
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RQ1: What roles does Dissent Theory play in informing an understanding of 
anonymous speech rights under the First Amendment? 
RQ: Do current statutes and court-established tests for unmasking anonymous 
speakers comport with the First Amendment?  
RQ3: What understanding can the transmission and ritual models of 
communication provide when thinking about anonymity, jurisdiction, and 
community standards? 
To answer these questions, this thesis employs traditional legal research 
methods to study the First Amendment and related jurisprudence. In so doing, it 
endeavors to provide a much-needed analysis of proper First Amendment protections 
for anonymous speech in the online world by examining theoretical justifications for the 
protection of speech as well as the relationship between this theory and particular legal 
responses to anonymous speech.  
 Because many of the lawsuits involving anonymous commenters are based on 
disparaging speech that one party believes to be false, this thesis begins with a 
discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal defamation cases. A discussion of the 
historical protections for anonymous speech follows, providing a foundation for the 
discussion of anonymous speech online. This paper examines multiple cases to establish 
the judicial standards that courts have developed to determine whether to unmask the 
identity of anonymous commenters online. A case study of the recent Yelp decision 
follows, highlighting the incongruity with these various standards. Next, an in-depth 
examination of James Carey’s models of communication and the theoretical 
  9 
justifications for protecting anonymous and harmful speech explain the need for a 
national unmasking standard. To conclude, the thesis proposes an unmasking law that 
comports with First Amendment protections of speech and societal interest in punishing 
harmful speakers for their misdeeds.  
II. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Although the First Amendment posits, “Congress shall make no law … 
abridging the freedom of speech,”50 the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that 
the First Amendment is not absolute.51 The First Amendment protects speakers from 
government sanction of their speech, most notably in the form of protections against 
censorship.52 However, the Court has been clear that certain categories of speech fall 
outside of First Amendment protection,53 and it has established still other instances in 
which post-publication punishment is permissible.54  
Although the Court considers defamation beyond the penumbra of First 
Amendment protection, modern jurisprudence has made clear that certain defamatory 
speech is not actionable.55 The Court has applied differing standards56 to grant 
“strategic protection to defamatory falsehood.”57 It has done so to “assure to the 
                                                 
50
 U.S. Const. amend. 1. 
51
 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
52
 Near v. Minnesota 283 US 697, 712-713 (1931). 
53
 The Court has found that certain kinds of speech do not warrant protection. Categories of condemned 
speech are: fighting words, Chaplinsky, supra note 54; defamation, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964); true threats, Watts v. United States 394 U.S. 705 (1969); obscenity, Miller v. California 
413 U.S. 15 (1973); and child pornography, New York v. Ferber 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
54
 Near, supra note 52 prohibited the prior restraint of speech, but plaintiffs are free to seek redress after 
publication. For example, in the case of defamation, plaintiffs may sue for libel to address the harms 
attached to defamatory publication, see Gertz supra note 16.  
55
 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
56
 Gertz, supra note 16 at 341-43. 
57
 Id. at 342. 
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freedoms of speech and press that ‘breathing space’ essential to their fruitful 
exercise.”58 
Defamation and the First Amendment Protections for Speech  
The concept of defamation came to the United States through the British 
common law. Though some versions of the tort, such as seditious libel, did not survive 
the founding of the nation,59 American law has long endeavored to balance the First 
Amendment rights of speakers against the tangible harm that words can cause to one’s 
reputation. Though the First Amendment does not fully protect defamatory speech, the 
law recognizes that claims of defamation may be used to silence and intimidate 
speakers. Because of this, American courts have been especially careful to guard 
speech, particularly when it concerns public officials and public figures.  
In 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court constitutionalized the law of defamation in its 
landmark New York Times v. Sullivan decision.60 There, the Court ruled that public 
officials could not recover damages in defamation lawsuits unless they showed that a 
defamatory statement was published with “actual malice.”61 The majority opinion, 
penned by Justice William Brennan, noted that historically the First Amendment 
stringently protected political speech because of its high value to democracy. He 
characterized the civil rights advertisement at issue in the case as, “[A]n expression of 
grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would seem clearly 
to qualify for the constitutional protection. The question is whether it forfeits that 
                                                 
58
 Id.  
59
 James Alexander, A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger, Printer of the New 
York Weekly Journal, 29-30 (2d ed.1972). 
60
 New York Times, supra note 55. 
61
 Id. at 280. 
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protection by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged defamation 
of respondent.”62 
To bolster this argument, Justice Brennan pointed to dicta to show that mere 
falsity should not be enough to remove protection from speech: “The constitutional 
protection does not turn upon ‘the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and 
beliefs which are offered.’”63 He also noted that to fully protect speech, some odious 
expression must be allowed to swim through society’s waters without being pierced by 
the legal spear. If speech that is merely false or distasteful cannot escape legal sanction, 
citizens will hesitate to express their thoughts. Excessive self-editing would hamper the 
free flow of public debate because proving the absolute truth is often difficult.64 Speech 
that criticizes a public official has political value and may influence their fitness for 
holding the office.65 To balance the competing interests between reputational harm and 
First Amendment rights, the Court reasoned that public officials who sue for libel must 
prove the defendant acted with “actual malice,”66 which it defined as knowledge of 
falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth.67   
The New York Times v. Sullivan case provided a standard for public officials 
claiming defamation, but it did not address the level of fault that public figures or 
private citizens would be required to prove to succeed in a defamation lawsuit. In Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court found that public figures should be held to the same 
                                                 
62
 Id. at 271. 
63
 Id. quoting N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963). 
64
 Id. at 279. 
65
 Id. at 284. 
66
 Id. at 280. 
67
 Id. at 280. 
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standard as Sullivan.68 In Gertz v. Welch, the Court ruled that states are free to 
determine the level of appropriate fault that private citizens must prove so long as they 
could not succeed on a theory of strict liability.69 The majority found that the balance of 
state interest was different as private individuals had more to lose from libelous speech, 
which made the state’s interest in protection of reputation more compelling on two 
grounds.70 First, public figures are less dependent on legal remedies because they have 
better access to “the channels of effective communication,”71 which grant them an 
opportunity to refute defamatory speech.72 Private figures have a much more limited 
access to counter-speech remedies, which means the government has a greater interest 
in granting them protection.73 Second, public figures purposefully enter into the public 
eye.74 Though First Amendment interests were still important, the Court noted:  
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However 
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the 
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there 
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.75 
 
However, this more compelling state interest did not completely override constitutional 
protections for speakers. The Court limited the damages a plaintiff could gain without 
showing that the defendant had acted with “knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard 
for the truth.”76 In addition, the plaintiff who did not prove actual malice was only 
entitled to damages that would reimburse him for the injury and nothing more. The goal 
                                                 
68
 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
69
 Gertz, supra note 16 at 347. 
70
 Id. at 348. 
71
 Id. at 344. 
72
 Id.  
73
 Id.  
74
 Id.  
75
 Id. at 339. 
76
 Id. at 349. 
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was to compensate private individuals for harms, including financial loss, reputational 
denigration, lowered community standing, humiliation, and mental anguish.77  
 Sullivan and its progeny show that dishonest speech is not necessarily legally 
actionable. In fact, the Court has recognized that false speech is entitled to some First 
Amendment protection.78 It concedes that inaccuracy is a natural outgrowth of an 
exuberant and hearty democracy.79 Therefore, the law shields some objectionable 
expression to avoid chilling speech; otherwise, well-intentioned citizens could silence 
themselves for fear of legal recourse for unintentional misstatements.80 Post-publication 
punishment for limited categories of speech comports with the First Amendment.81  
 Harmful v. Distasteful Speech 
 Throughout its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has tried to distinguish 
between harmful speech and merely distasteful speech, protecting the latter but not the 
former. The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that it will not create new categories 
of speech that fall outside First Amendment protection. Though the Court has recently 
had two opportunities to remove categories of speech from the penumbra of First 
Amendment protection, it has declined to do so. In United States v. Stevens,82 the Court 
found a federal law criminalizing the knowing sale of animal crush videos infringed 
upon First Amendment rights.83 Though the United States had a long history of 
prohibiting animal cruelty, the Court declined to extend that prohibition to mere 
                                                 
77
 Id. at 350. 
78
 US v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. ___, 6 (2012).  
79
 Id.; Gertz, supra note 16 at 340. 
80
 Id. at 340-41.  
81
 Alvarez, supra note 79 at 12. 
82
 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
83
 Id. at 1585. 
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depictions of abuse. Proscribing actual harm was much different than withdrawing 
protection from an entire category of speech.84 Similarly, when California lawmakers 
attempted to ban the sale of violent video games to children, the Court found the law 
unconstitutional.85 Though some content has been considered inappropriate for minors 
in the past, the Court ruled that violent videos did not meet the “harmful to minors” 
standard it had used in previous cases.86 Just as the Court declined to circumscribe the 
sale of non-obscene animal crush videos, it declined to create an unprotected category 
of speech for violent video games.87  
 Protecting low value speech, such as violent video games and animal crush 
videos, has a long history in the Court. The Court has ruled that the First Amendment 
protects most hate speech, which many consider deplorable and low value, unless it 
rises to the level of fighting words. In RAV v. City of Saint Paul,88 the Court found that 
though the law was created with “fighting words”89 prohibitions in mind, the ordinance 
ended up proscribing the content of protected speech.90 This sort of prohibition 
generally flies in the face of the First Amendment. Other categories of proscribable 
speech, including defamation, are exceptions because:  
[T]hese areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated 
because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, 
etc.)— not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, 
so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their 
distinctively proscribable content. (sic)91  
                                                 
84
 Id. 
85
 Brown v. Entertainment Merchant’s Association, 564 U. S. ____, 4-5 (2011). 
86
 Id. at 6. 
87
 Id. at 7. 
88
 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
89
 Id. at 381. 
90
 Id. at 391. 
91
 Id. at 383-84. 
  15 
 
The RAV Court noted that the ordinance showed governmental favoritism to 
communication of certain ideas over others: “Displays containing abusive invective, no 
matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the 
specified disfavored topics.”92  
 Much of the online speech that people complain about is merely distasteful. 
Online commenters hate trolling93 and flaming94 but the First Amendment protects 
speech that is disruptive and derailing. Like the offline world, in cyberspace unless 
speech falls into one of the unprotected categories, it will not be regulated.95 As a result, 
constitutional safeguards remain in place even for potentially damaging online speech.  
III. ANONYMOUS SPEECH 
The First Amendment often protects expression that may harm others, even 
when it is proffered anonymously. Repeatedly, the Court has found constitutional 
protection for anonymity even though the protection may shield mischievous and 
malicious speakers from retaliation. Throughout American history, anonymity has 
played a special role in society. The Framers relied on anonymity to exchange ideas. 
They used names like Cato and Publius to encourage the free flow of thought.96 
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Cloaking their identities often meant the difference between contributing to political 
discourse and physical punishment, including whippings and the pillory.97 According to 
Jonathan Turley, “Like the right to distribute thoughts, the right to anonymous thoughts 
is an essential component of free speech.”98  
As American culture has evolved, so has technology, which influences how 
speakers participate in anonymous expression.99 To grasp how courts view and deal 
with free speech online, one must engage how the courts have traditionally understood 
protection of anonymous speech. Unearthing those principles garners a clearer 
understanding of how lower courts try to apply those values to anonymity on the 
Internet.  
Anonymity in “Real Space” 
 In National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. State of 
Alabama,100 the Court addressed whether Alabama could require the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to reveal the names and 
addresses of supporters without infringing on the due process protections of the 14th 
Amendment.101 The case also dealt with First Amendment protection from compelled 
disclosure of identity and association.102 The Court found that the NAACP could 
combat the disclosure of its members because revelation of such information could 
significantly and adversely affect the organization through “diminished financial 
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support and membership”103 Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, stated, “Compelled 
disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in advocacy of particular beliefs 
is of the same order. Inviolability of privacy in-group association may in many 
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly 
where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”104 Protection for members of groups who are 
not expressing popular views is especially important because history has shown that 
dissenting persons often face hardships for their beliefs.105 Dissenters may be fired, 
threatened with violence, or fall victim to other hostile actions.106 Thus, nonconformist 
expression garnered a significant amount of protection, a shield that Alabama had 
inadequately justified lowering.107 The state’s interest was not compelling enough to 
validate releasing the information when weighed against the toll it could take on 
members’ constitutional rights.108  
 In 1960, the Supreme Court considered a Los Angeles ordinance that restricted 
the anonymous distribution of fliers. The law mandated that all handbills must include 
the name and address of the person who “printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured”109 
the product, as well as the name of the person who distributed it or the “true names and 
addresses of the owners, managers or agents of the person sponsoring said hand-bill.”110 
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Manuel Talley was arrested for violating the ordinance and challenged its 
constitutionality.111  
The Court had previously found that banning the distribution of literature was an 
unconstitutional form of censorship. Drawing on earlier precedent, the Court ruled the 
Los Angeles ordinance was not an exception because it encompassed protected 
speech.112 Looking historically, the Court concluded, “Even the Federalist Papers, 
written in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were published under fictitious 
names. It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive 
purposes.”113 Prohibiting anonymity would restrict free speech because unpopular 
speakers were likely to silence themselves to avoid retaliation.114 Judge Hugo Black 
wrote that “there are times and circumstances when States may not compel members of 
groups engaged in the dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified,”115 and this was 
one of those times.  
In a concurring opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan argued that the 
government must show a compelling interest to censor speech and that the overly broad 
speech ordinance could not support such a claim because Los Angeles was unable to 
demonstrate harm related to distribution handbills.116 In his dissent, Justice Thomas 
Campbell Clark argued that the ordinance was enacted because someone asked the city 
council to “do something about these handbills and advertising matters which were false 
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or misleading.”117 Clark argued that by employing his standard118 the Court would find 
that signing a name did not infringe on Talley’s free speech rights.119  
More than 30 years after the Talley Court ruled in support of anonymous speech, 
the Court would again address the issue in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,120 
There, the Court decided whether an Ohio law that prohibited the circulation of 
anonymous campaign materials contravened the First Amendment. Margaret McIntyre 
distributed fliers to people attending a public meeting at a middle school in which a tax 
levy was to be discussed. The literature conveyed McIntyre’s disapproval of the levy. 
The leaflets contained no false or libelous content, and she had signed some of them.121 
Though McIntyre knew that her fliers did not adhere to the Ohio election laws, she 
appeared with more circulars at another meeting.122 
The majority found that the First Amendment protected McIntyre’s right to 
speak anonymously. Justice John Paul Stevens penned the majority opinion and argued 
that  
Despite readers’ curiosity and the public's interest in identifying the creator of a 
work of art, an author generally is free to decide whether or not to disclose his or 
her true identity. The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear 
of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely 
by a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible. Whatever the 
motivation may be, at least in the field of literary endeavor, the interest in 
having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably 
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outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry. 
Accordingly, an author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions 
concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of 
the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.123  
 
Justice Stevens linked anonymity with the highly protected category of political speech, 
reminding other jurists that the democratic process relies on, and protects, anonymous 
voting.124  
Unlike the Talley ordinance, the Ohio law only applied to unsigned works that 
were designed to sway voters, rather than serving as a blanket prohibition on all 
anonymous speech. Ohio relied on cases that dealt with election process to argue that 
the law passed constitutional scrutiny.125 Justice Stevens rejected the “ordinary election 
restriction”126 balancing test. He argued that the law was a ban on the content of speech, 
which meant the Court had to use “exacting scrutiny”127 to analyze the provision.128 
Indeed, the Court wrote that McIntyre’s anonymous words – pure political speech – 
were at the core of First Amendment protection.129 Though Ohio did have an interest in 
prohibiting harmful speech, Stevens argued that laws prohibiting dissemination of false 
and libelous speech during campaigns were a more effective way of addressing the 
harm.130 
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 The McIntyre court found that the Constitution strenuously protected 
anonymous political speech because it is not a “pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an 
honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny 
of the majority.”131 In Justice Scalia’s dissent, he quibbled with the way Stevens framed 
the test. He argued that normally a strict scrutiny approach would find the law invalid, 
but the majority’s hesitance to say that the state may never prohibit anonymous speech 
created a very unclear standard that would open the door to a lot of litigation and 
confusion in the future.132 
 Four years after McIntyre, the Court heard a case from Colorado after the state 
placed restrictions on electioneering practices. It required canvassers to be registered 
voters and wear an identifying badge that included their real name and whether they 
were paid or volunteer. Further, organizers of such initiatives needed to report the name 
and addresses of all paid canvassers along with the amount each was paid.133  
The state argued the law helped the public identify and reprimand pollsters who 
misbehaved.134 The Court ruled that forcing the circulators to wear name badges and 
listing their names and income was unconstitutional. Other disclosure requirements that 
did not infringe on free speech rights properly advanced the state’s interest.135 
Through the disclosure requirements that remain in place, voters are informed of 
the source and amount of money spent by proponents to get a measure on the 
ballot; in other words, voters will be told “who has proposed [a measure],” and 
“who has provided funds for its circulation.”… The added benefit of revealing 
the names of paid circulators and amounts paid to each circulator, the lower 
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courts fairly determined from the record as a whole, is hardly apparent and has 
not been demonstrated.136 
 
Similarly, in 2002, the Court considered an Ohio ordinance that required 
canvassers to obtain a permit before ringing doorbells. Canvassers were required to 
carry the permit with them and show it to anyone who asked to see it.137 The Village of 
Stratton interpreted this ordinance to include Jehovah’s Witnesses and their 
proselytization.138  
 The majority noted that the Court had historically struck down restrictions on 
door-to-door stumping.139 Again, the Court was required to balance the First 
Amendment rights of would-be canvassers with the right of the government to protect 
citizens from fraud.140 The majority found the ordinance did not pass First Amendment 
scrutiny because the law prohibited a broad category of speech, which included political 
and religious expression.141 The village argued that the ordinance prevented fraud, 
crime, and invasion of resident privacy.142 The Court found that the law was not only 
overbroad, but also ineffective because criminals could likely find another excuse to 
make house calls.143  
IV. UNMASKING JURISPRUDENCE   
Anonymity in Cyberspace  
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 Of course, in recent years, anonymous speech cases have increased because of 
the Internet.144 The Court has ruled that speech in cyberspace garners traditional 
constitutional protection145 because the potential to host a rich variety of speech is 
boundless.146 However, Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act (CDA) serves 
to complicate litigation surrounding online anonymous speech. The CDA generally 
immunizes Internet Service Providers from liability for what third parties post.147 Even 
websites that encourage harmful or offensive speech are often immune from legal 
sanction.148 The law requires victims of harmful speech online sue the person who 
posted the content rather than the entity who hosted the content,149 which can 
complicate defamation cases.  
 This section analyzes various anonymous online speech cases to illustrate the 
points of discord and consensus within various jurisdictions. Although the aim of this 
thesis is not to provide a complete history of unmasking cases, it instead strives to 
describe how the key elements of the major tests differ, which may threaten the 
constitutional protection of speech. Examining crucial pieces of the unmasking 
jurisprudence mosaic highlights where courts agree and diverge and in so doing, 
underscores the need for a nationwide unmasking standard. 
 Columbia Insurance v. SeesCandy.com: The Beginnings of Unmasking  
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 One of the first cases to deal with unmasking anonymous users involved a 
trademark and domain name dispute between Columbia Insurance Company, an 
organization that managed the trademarks of See’s Candy Shops, and a person who 
registered the domain names “seescandy.com” and “seecandys.com.”150 Columbia 
could not determine who actually purchased the domains because the registration 
information and host of the web address switched multiple times.151 The court noted 
that typically, to bring a claim against a party, the plaintiff would have to be able to 
identify the persons who executed the tortious deeds.152  
However, the special nature of anonymity on the Internet led to the practice of 
allowing limited discovery. This enabled plaintiffs to learn the necessary details to serve 
the defendants.153 However, the judge noted that  
Pre-service discovery is akin to the process used during criminal investigations 
to obtain warrants. The requirement that the government show probable cause is, 
in part, a protection against the misuse of ex parte procedures to invade the 
privacy of one who has done no wrong. A similar requirement is necessary here 
to prevent abuse of this extraordinary application of the discovery process and to 
ensure that plaintiff has standing to pursue an action against defendant.154 
 
The necessity of unmasking potential infringers must be weighed against the ability to 
participate anonymously or pseudonymously online.155 Judge D. Lowell Jensen wrote,  
This ability to speak one's mind without the burden of the other party knowing 
all the facts about one's identity can foster open communication and robust 
debate...People who have committed no wrong should be able to participate 
online without fear that someone who wishes to harass or embarrass them can 
                                                 
150
 Columbia Insurance Company v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
151
 Id. at 575-76. 
152
 Id. at 577. 
153
 Id. at 577-78. 
154
 Id. at 579-80 
155
 Id. at 578. 
  25 
file a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of the court's order to 
discover their identity.156 
 
To balance these interests, Judge Jensen developed a test. It requires that plaintiffs 
specifically identify the defendant, act in good faith, be able to withstand a motion to 
dismiss, and include only a “limited number of persons or entities” to serve the 
discovery process.157 Judge Jensen envisioned the motion to dismiss prong as a 
safeguard against compelling disclosure for cloaked speakers who do not engage in 
unlawful activities. He argued that to meet this standard a plaintiff must show “that an 
act giving rise to civil liability actually occurred and that the discovery is aimed at 
revealing specific identifying 
features of the person or entity who committed that act.”158 The court allowed Columbia 
14 days from the date of the order to submit a brief detailing pertinent information.159 
The SeesCandy.com case shows how the technological advancement of the Internet led 
to developments of special limited discovery methods to advance claims that involved 
anonymous defendants.160   
Subpoena Dues Tectum to America Online: Jurisdiction Jumping 
One year later, in 2000, the court addressed whether one jurisdiction can honor 
an order to perform discovery in another161 when an anonymous publicly traded 
company (APTC) attempted to subpoena America Online Inc. (AOL) to identify a 
                                                 
156
 Id. 
157
 Id. at 578-80. 
158
 Id. at 580. 
159
 Id. at 580-81. 
160
 Id. at 577-78. 
161
 In re SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO AMERICA ONLINE, INC. WL. 1210372, 1 (Va.Cir.Ct. 2000). 
  26 
handful of users.162 The users allegedly published defamatory and confidential 
information about APTC.163 APTC obtained an order from an Indiana court to perform 
discovery in Virginia, and asked a Virginia trial court to assist it by issuing a 
subpoena.164 AOL was not willing to disclose the information in part because APTC 
sought to remain anonymous until the John Does were unmasked.165 Indiana allowed 
APTC to stay anonymous. APTC asked Virginia to disregard AOL’s claims and argued 
that the subpoena would not “unreasonably burden the John Does’ free speech or 
privacy rights.”166  
 The judge created a standard that would balance retribution for the ill-use of 
online anonymity and the constitutional right to participate in unidentified 
communication.167 The court reviewed the allegedly defamatory comments to determine 
if APTC had a good faith basis for its claim.168 The court designed the following test169 
to weigh the needs of the state against the rights of the speaker: the plaintiff must have a 
convincing and sincere claim that is actionable in the jurisdiction where the suit was 
filed and the identity of the anonymous speaker must be imperative to proceed with a 
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lawsuit.170 The court reviewed the postings to determine whether APTC had a 
convincing “good faith” claim.171 
After reviewing the posts and the pleadings, the court found that APTC had 
satisfied all three prongs of the test.172 AOL argued that APTC’s methods to identify the 
email addresses of the anonymous commenters were fallible which could result in 
unnecessary unmasking.173 The court found that the compelling interest in unmasking 
the speakers warranted the “limited intrusion”174 into the email holders’ privacy even if 
they turned out not to have a legal obligation to APTC. The court denied AOL’s motion 
to quash.175  
 Doe v.2TheMart.com: Sweeping v. Specific Unmasking Requests  
 Though the APTC court found that the plaintiff’s interest in unmasking 
commenters justified the “limited intrusion” into anonymous speaker’s privacy, one 
year later a federal district court in the Western District of Washington held that 
anonymous commenters must be tied to tortious speech to be identified.176 In Doe v. 
2TheMart.com,177 2TheMart.com issued a subpoena to a website that had message 
boards devoted to 2TheMart. The subpoena requested that the website turn over “all 
identifying information and documents including, but not limited to, computerized or 
computer stored records and logs, electronic mail (E-mail), and postings on your online 
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message boards”178 of 23 posters. One Doe, who operated under the username 
“NoGuano,” filed a motion to quash, asserting his or her First Amendment right to 
speak anonymously.  
 Judge Thomas S. Zilly recognized the First Amendment right to anonymity 
articulated in McIntyre.179 The court also examined the SeesCandy.com and America 
Online Inc. cases and found that the unmasking standard used in both cases was not 
protective enough of free speech.180 Judge Zilly constructed a new standard: the 
subpoena must be issued in good faith and not for unfitting use; the information sought 
relates to a core claim, the identifying information is directly and materially pertinent to 
the claim, and the information needed to proceed with or refute a claim is not available 
in any other way.181  
Applying this test, the court found that, although 2TheMart did not seek the 
subpoena in bad faith, the broadness of the request would reveal a lot of information 
that was not germane to the lawsuit.182 Perhaps most damning to the case was that the 
Doe defendant trying to quash the subpoena had never posted anything on the 2TheMart 
message board.183 Instead, Doe had simply been in contact with other users who posted 
about 2TheMart.184 The court determined that the information 2TheMart needed was 
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otherwise available,185 and that 2TheMart could proceed with its defense without 
unmasking the users. The court quashed the subpoena.186 
Dendrite International v. Doe: Striking a Proper Balance 
Perhaps the most relied upon standard for unmasking anonymous commenters 
arose out of a 2001 decision by a New Jersey appellate court. In Dendrite International 
Inc. v. Doe No. 3,187 Dendrite brought a defamation action against commenters who 
posted on a Yahoo! bulletin board about the company.188 Although 14 Does were 
originally named, the court focused on the unmasking of John Doe 3 because Dendrite 
asserted those statements were defamatory.189 
Judge Robert A. Fall delivered the opinion of the court, and he argued that John 
Doe 3’s comments must be examined in context. After the release of Dendrite’s 
quarterly report,190 various stock analysts and The Center for Financial Research and 
Analysis issued a report about Dendrite's changed “revenue recognition.”191 
TheStreet.com also cautioned readers about the company’s “red flags.”192 Then, users 
posted information about the articles on the message board193 and John Doe 3 posted 
about Dendrite’s revenue recognition. Dendrite publically refuted the claims made in 
the financial report.194 Dendrite asserted that the statements Doe made were false, and 
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the company filed a complaint claiming that John Doe 3 misappropriated trade secrets 
and defamed the company.195 
Judge Fall considered the context of the comments but also relied on analysis 
from SeesCandy.com196 and APTC197 to design a test that included notice, identification 
of exact allegedly defamatory statements, a prima facie cause of action that can 
withstand a motion to dismiss, evidence to support each cause of action, and, finally, a 
balance of the defendant’s right to remain anonymous against the strength of the case.198 
Notice, as envisioned by the Dendrite court, required the plaintiff to take reasonable 
efforts to notify the anonymous user that he or she was the target of a subpoena.199 
Notice included writing a notification of pending discovery message in the same virtual 
venue the comments surfaced.200 Proper notice also required plaintiffs to postpone 
action for a reasonable amount of time so “fictitiously-named defendants” could have 
the opportunity to oppose the unmasking of their identities.201 
The court relied heavily on the SeesCandy.com case to explain the motion to 
dismiss standard. Typically, the motion to dismiss standard meant that New Jersey 
courts should allow plaintiffs to proceed if the “cause of action is ‘suggested’ by the 
facts.”202 However, the court relied on the SeesCandy.com case, which determined that 
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a more flexible interpretation of “motion to dismiss” was warranted.203 The court 
adopted the SeesCandy.com definition of motion to dismiss, which held that a “plaintiff 
should establish to the court's satisfaction that plaintiff's suit against defendant could 
withstand a motion to dismiss” (sic)204 and “that an act giving rise to civil liability 
actually occurred.”205 This tweaked definition served as a “flexible, non-technical, fact-
sensitive mechanism”206 that would help courts forfend using discovery as 
punishment.207 
Courts could use this motion to dismiss standard to evaluate the evidence 
plaintiffs must present to support each element of their claim. The court must find that 
the evidence shows the claims seem true at first glance.208 Finally, judges balance the 
strength of the case against the speaker’s First Amendment right to anonymity.209 To 
note the importance of anonymity online, the court compared the Internet to a “vast 
library” and a “sprawling mall” for readers and for publishers, which it referred to as “a 
worldwide audience of millions.”210 Dendrite submitted its trading records to the court 
as proof that John Doe’s comments harmed its stock value. 211 The court did not find 
Dendrite’s stock fluctuations compelling.212 New Jersey law protects more personal 
rights to free speech than the First Amendment because the “…state right of free speech 
is protected not only from abridgment by government, but also from unreasonably 
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restrictive and oppressive conduct by private entities.”213 This heightened protection 
undergirded the court’s decision that Dendrite could not unmask Doe 3 because it had 
not proved Doe’s statements were harmful to the company.214  
The Dendrite standard dealt with a company seeking identifying information, 
but traditionally courts have held public officials to different standards than private 
parties. New York Times v. Sullivan held that public officials must meet a higher burden 
of proof to successfully win a defamation claim.215 In the next case, one state supreme 
court modified the Dendrite standard in a case involving public officials. 
Cahill v. Doe: Simplifying the Balance for Public Officials 
Four years later, the Supreme Court of Delaware tweaked the Dendrite standard 
after a town council member, Patrick Cahill, and his wife sued four anonymous online 
commenters of defamation and invasion of privacy.216 The case focused on a John Doe 
who had posted two comments on a blog about Cahill. The first comment mentioned 
Cahill’s integrity and sanity: “Anyone who has spent any amount of time with Cahill 
would be keenly aware of such character flaws, not to mention an obvious mental 
deterioration.”217 Doe’s second comment stated, “Gahill [sic] is as paranoid as everyone 
in the town thinks he is.”218 Using a good faith standard similar to the one employed in 
the SeesCandy.com case, the superior court judge determined that Cahill could unmask 
the anonymous commenter.219 Doe appealed.220  
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Chief Justice Myron T. Steele, writing for the court, cited Doe’s First 
Amendment right as an anonymous speaker engaging in political commentary and 
noted that online speech could serve important democratic functions. “Anonymous 
Internet speech in blogs or chat rooms in some instances can become the modern 
equivalent of political pamphleteering. As the United States Supreme Court recently 
noted, ‘anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an 
honorable tradition of advocacy and dissent.’”221As a city council person, Cahill was a 
public figure, who would have a lot to gain in unmasking speakers.222  
The Cahill court found the good faith standard presented inadequate protection 
for anonymous speech.223 The court also did away with the motion to dismiss standard. 
It argued that frivolous lawsuits could easily pass the motion to dismiss prong of a test 
when the defendant was not present to make counter arguments.224 Instead, the court 
argued that a summary judgment standard was the most appropriate way to circumvent 
chilling speech 225 especially when the plaintiff was a public figure.226 The summary 
judgement standard, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby 
Inc.227 is when courts consider “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement 
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to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party prevails as a 
matter of law.”228 
The court retained the notice prong of the Dendrite test, which included posting 
a message on the same space the comments were published. The court also preserved 
the waiting period embedded in the notice prong of the test.229 However, the Cahill 
court eliminated the prong that required plaintiffs to provide the exact statements they 
thought were tortious.230 It argued that plaintiffs must quote defamatory statements in 
their complaint to satisfy the summary judgement standard so the specific statement 
prong of the Dendrite test was redundant.231 Further, Judge Steele argued that the 
summary judgement standard was the balance232 and that including a separate balancing 
prong would needlessly complicate the unmasking test while not providing more 
protection to defendants.233   
The Cahill standard, with two prongs, was much simpler than the Dendrite test. 
First, the plaintiff must make reasonable efforts to notify the anonymous defendant of 
the subpoena.234 Second, the plaintiff must fulfill the summary judgement 
requirements.235 When it applied this new two-prong test, the court found Cahill’s 
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defamation claim lacking because a reasonable person would have assumed that the 
statements were Doe’s opinion.236  
Mobilisa v. Doe: One Unmasking Standard for All 
In 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals examined both the Cahill and Dendrite 
standards when deciding the first online anonymous speech case in the state. The CEO 
of Mobilisa used his business email address to send private emails to a woman with 
whom he had a “personal relationship.”237 Six days later a John Doe, using an email 
address hosted by a company called The Suggestion Box, sent a copy of that email to 
various people including Mobilisa management with the subject line “Is this the 
company you want to work for?”238 
Mobilisa filed suit in Washington, listing 10 John Does as defendants in 
violation of two federal laws as well as common law trespass to chattels. Essentially, all 
the claims linked back to the central idea that the Does “accessed Mobilisa’s protected 
computer systems and email accounts without or in excess of authorization.”239 The 
lower court used the Cahill standard and ultimately ruled that Mobilisa could obtain 
Doe’s identifying information,240 and the case was appealed.241 
Mobilisa urged the appeals court to adopt a less stringent unmasking standard 
because Mobilisa’s case dealt with “property-based claims for wrongful access to 
Mobilisa’s email system and is not dependent on the nature of speech involved,”242 
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rather than purely expressive speech.243 Rejecting that idea, the court stated, “Whether 
the claim is one for defamation or a property-based claim, the potential for chilling 
anonymous speech remains the same.”244 The court argued that adopting a different 
standard would encourage plaintiffs to make non-defamation claims to obtain the less 
rigorous standard, and that a single standard would ensure consistent rulings.245  
The Arizona court agreed with the notice requirement in Cahill and Dendrite, 
which required the plaintiffs to notify the defendants of the discovery request and wait a 
reasonable amount of time before proceeding with the action.246 It also embraced the 
summary judgement standard in Cahill, but stipulated that the court should only require 
plaintiffs to produce evidence that was within their grasp 247 or “all elements not 
dependent upon knowing the identity of the anonymous speaker.”248 
The court also adopted the balancing prong in the Dendrite case and weighed 
the party’s case against the anonymous right to free speech.249 Judge Ann A. Scott 
Timmer, writing for the majority, argued that a balance must consider the reason the 
First Amendment protects speakers, the type of speech involved, the speaker’s 
expectation of privacy, the consequences of an unmasking, whether identifying the 
speaker is needed to advance the claim, and whether other discovery options are 
available.250 After designing this standard, the court found that Mobilisa gave notice and 
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passed the summary judgement standard.251 The lower court had not considered the 
balancing prong, so the court remanded the case, with instructions to rely on the new 
part of the test.252  
The AutoAdmit.com case: When Anonymity Shields Harmful Speakers 
By 2008, cases involving anonymous online speech had begun to make news, 
and the AutoAdmit.com case was no exception. There, two Jane Does who were law 
students at Yale issued a subpoena duces tecum to an ISP to obtain the IP address of 
users, including “AK47,” who had posted comments on AutoAdmit.com, a law school 
admissions website. The plaintiffs argued they were the victims of “defamatory, 
threatening and harassing”253 speech from various users. AK47 filed a motion to quash 
the subpoena, and became the key party to the case.  
 The first post about Jane Doe II appeared in January 2007, and it included a link 
to her picture and instructed users to “Rate this HUGE breasted cheerful big tit girl from 
YLS.”254 The posts about the women continued for months. As the posts multiplied, so 
did the vulgarity of the comments. Some posters said one of the women: fantasized 
about being raped by her father, enjoyed having sex while family members watched, 
encouraged others to punch her in the stomach while seven months pregnant, had a 
sexually transmitted disease, and had abused heroin. One poster wrote that he or she, 
“hope[d] she gets raped and dies.”255 
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During the period in which these posts multiplied into the hundreds, AK47, a 
user known for posting problematic comments posted, “Alex Atkind, Stephen 
Reynolds, [Doe II], and me: GAY LOVERS.”256 Messages similar to those posted on 
AutoAdmit.com were also sent to faculty members and Doe II’s future employer.257 
Once AK47 learned about the lawsuit, he further engaged in vitriolic speech against the 
women, posting things like “Women named Jill and Doe II should be raped” and 
starting a new topic titled, “Inflicting emotional distress on cheerful girls named [Doe 
II].” 258  
The federal trial court engaged a test to determine unmasking which included: 
notice, identification of actionable speech, specificity and alternative means to obtaining 
the information, centrality to the plaintiff’s claim, the subpoenaed party’s expectation of 
privacy at the time the content was posted, and whether the plaintiffs have “adequately 
showed” a prima facie claim against the defendant.259 The notice requirement mirrored 
the standards adopted in Dendrite and Cahill, which required the party to attempt to 
notify the anonymous speaker of the subpoena.260 Again, like the Dendrite test, the 
court determined that plaintiffs must supply evidence to support their claims, which 
meant submitting the exact statements that were allegedly tortious for review.261 
Drawing on the SeesCandy.com case for the third prong of the test, Judge Christopher 
F. Droney asserted that plaintiffs should seek relevant identifying information that is 
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imperative to advancing the claim.262 The fourth prong considers the defendants’ 
expectations of privacy when they wrote the comment.263 The fifth prong also drew on 
Dendrite’s test, which required that claims satisfy each element of a prima facie 
claim.264  
 Judge Droney rejected the “good faith” standard saying it was not a stringent 
enough protection of speech.265 He also quibbled with the motion to dismiss standard 
articulated in Dendrite and SeesCandy.com266 and the summary judgment standard in 
Cahill.267 He noted that the motion to dismiss standard was too confusing because 
separate jurisdictions had different motion to dismiss procedures and the summary 
judgment standard was too difficult to satisfy.268 Judge Droney found the plaintiff had 
issued a legitimate subpoena and that AK47 should be unmasked as the statements he 
made were defamatory.269  
 Independent Newspapers v. Brodie: The Continuing Evolution of Dendrite and 
Cahill  
 In 2006, a number of anonymous commenters set out to besmirch the reputation 
of a local developer on the website of a local newspaper.270  The comments suggested a 
local man, Zebulon J. Brodie, who also owned a Dunkin’ Donuts, ran a “dirty and 
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unsanitary” pastry place271 and let trash from the establishment leak into the 
waterway.272 Users also accused him of “torching”273 a historical home and having no 
“sense of decency.”274 Brodie argued that the statements were defamatory because they 
harmed his profession and employment.275  
 Maryland’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, took the case to “sort out the 
record”276 and guide lower courts in balancing defamation claims against anonymous 
speech rights.277 The court modeled its standard after the Dendrite test, but opined that 
the “motion to dismiss”278 and “good faith”279 standards would be so low that they 
would, 
inhibit the use of the Internet as a marketplace of ideas, where boundaries for 
participation in public discourse melt away, and anyone with access to a 
computer can speak to an audience… With the Internet, users can bypass 
commercial publishers and editors “to speak to one another across the 
boundaries of divergent cultures,”… These concepts, not theoretical but 
practical, promote public discourse and must be guaranteed the protection of the 
First Amendment.280 
 
On the other hand, the court noted that compelling plaintiffs to pass a summary 
judgment standard would be too protective of anonymity.281 This overprotectiveness 
would “undermine personal accountability and the search for truth, by requiring 
claimants to essentially prove their case before even knowing who the commentator 
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was.”282 Instead, like the AutoAdmit.com court, the Brodie court argued that the plaintiff 
must establish a prima facie defamation claim.  
 The court split the test into five parts. The first two prongs encompass the notice 
standard articulated in Dendrite.283 First, plaintiffs must make a reasonable attempt to 
notify speakers of the subpoena. Then, the party must wait a reasonable amount of time 
before pursuing action to allow defendants time to respond.284 Third, like the prongs in 
both the AutoAdmit.com and Dendrite cases, the plaintiffs should identify the actionable 
statements.285 Fourth, the court should determine whether there is a prima facie case 
against the anonymous posters286 and, finally, courts should balance the strength of the 
prima facie case and the need for disclosure to advance the claim against the First 
Amendment right to remain anonymous.287 Using this new test, the court found that 
Brodie’s claims did not outweigh protection of speech. 
As these cases show, courts have created numerous standards to try to balance 
constitutional rights and redress for harm. Though this list of cases is not an exhaustive 
list of every test ever used, it shows how lower courts are developing standards based 
on the facts before them. The Dendrite and Cahill cases articulate the most relied upon 
standards288 but the two tests are so varied it is difficult to assert that one is the majority 
standard.289 Some of the tests, such as the Dendrite and Cahill standards,290 give proper 
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weight to the First Amendment by requiring plaintiffs to provide significant factual 
evidence that their case could go to trial, while others, such as the “good faith” standard 
articulated in the APTC case,291 give too much leeway to unmasking. As further 
analysis will show, the Yelp case was poorly decided because the Virginia statute 
inappropriately limits the power of the First Amendment.  
V. CASE STUDY YELP V. HADEED CARPET CLEANING 
 Though the Supreme Court has regularly protected anonymity in traditional 
contexts, it has yet to squarely address the issue of anonymous speech online. The Yelp 
v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning Inc.292 case highlights the numerous challenges 
commonplace to cases that involve anonymous speech online. Courts around the 
country have applied various standards in cases seeking to unmask the identities of 
anonymous speakers.293 As it stands, no single bright-line rule has developed to guide 
judges in the disposition of these cases. A thorough synopsis of the Yelp case unearths 
these conflicts and provides fertile ground to discuss First Amendment free speech 
issues.  
When Hadeed filed its subpoena, it argued, “Determining whether or not 
Defendants were customers of Hadeed is centrally necessary for Hadeed to advance any 
defamation claim.”294 Hadeed asked Yelp to turn over information the company had 
about the anonymous commenters.295 To rate businesses, users must register with Yelp 
and provide a valid email address. Yelp records the Internet Protocol (IP) address 
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attached to each post and stores the information in San Francisco.296 Yelp is less 
stringent on other information; members are not required to use their real names or zip 
codes.297 
Hadeed asserted that if the commenters were not actual customers, their 
statements were per se false and defamatory.298 Yelp countered that the Virginia court 
had no jurisdiction over the website299 and that its Terms of Service required all legal 
matters be handled in California.300 However, the court found that Virginia did have 
jurisdiction over Yelp because it had a registered agent in the state. The court held that 
even if Yelp did not have a registered agent, Virginia would still have jurisdiction 
because Yelp directed electronic activity to Virginia.301 Writing for the majority, Judge 
William G. Petty emphasized the website’s Terms of Service and Content Guidelines 
(TOS), which held that users had to be customers of the business to post a review.302 
Judge Petty acknowledged that the First Amendment protects anonymous speech both 
online and offline:  
An Internet user does not shed his free speech rights at the log-in screen. The 
right to free speech is assiduously guarded in all mediums of expression, from 
the analog to the digital. The anonymous pamphleteer has the right to distribute 
literature without the looming specter of government interference. Similarly, the 
anonymous speaker has the right to express himself on the Internet without the 
fear that his veil of anonymity will be pierced for no other reason than because 
another person disagrees with him.303 
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However, the judge was quick to point out that the First Amendment does not protect all 
anonymous speech. Anonymous speakers can be forcefully identified if “certain 
procedural safeguards are met.”304 The Yelp court argued that Virginia statute properly 
provided this procedural protection to cloaked expression.305 According to the Yelp 
court, false anonymous speech garners a lower level of protection than truthful, political 
speech.306 
The court acknowledged that Yelp posts are typically opinion, which means the 
First Amendment often protects them. However, if the posters were not customers then 
they posted “false statements of fact”307 – exactly the kind of statements that can fall 
beyond the scope of First Amendment protection. The court did little to engage the 
content of the reviews to determine if they were defamatory. The contested reviews 
included:  
“Bob G.” from Oakton allegedly relates how he was in a desperate need of 
emergency carpet cleaning and was ripped off. User “Chris H.” from 
Washington reported that his precious rugs were shrunk. User “J8.” from Falls 
Church reports that he was charged for work never performed. User “YB.” from 
Fairfax reports that unauthorized work was performed and his rug was stained. 
One user, “Aris P.” from Haddonfield, N.J. reports that the price was double the 
quote and that Hadeed was once bankrupt. Many of the negative reviews report 
that the price was double what was charged [sic].308 
 
 In Virginia, defamation law requires a plaintiff show that statements are both “false and 
defamatory” and meet three elements: publication, actionable statement, and requisite 
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intent.309 Libelous speech that causes bias against a profession is defamation per se 
according to Virginia law.310  
To further complicate the case, Virginia had a unique unmasking law311 that 
included six parts: 1) notice of the subpoena must be sent to the anonymous speaker 
through the ISP; 2) the comments are or could be tortious; 3) the plaintiff has a sincere 
belief that he or she is a victim of actionable speech; 4) “reasonable” efforts to identify 
the speaker were unsuccessful; 5) uncovering the speaker’s identity is germane to the 
case; 6) there is no pending challenge to the legitimacy of the lawsuit; and finally, 7) the 
anonymous commenter likely has relevant information about the case.312 The appeals 
court found that the trial court did not err in granting the subpoena duces tecum.313  
Yelp argued that the court should apply a more stringent unmasking standard 
than what was outlined in the statute because the Virginia standard did not require the 
plaintiff to produce enough evidence to show that it had a valid claim before piercing 
the veil of anonymity.314 The majority declined to implement a different standard.315 
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The court found that Hadeed met the second prong of the test as it had two options for 
satisfying this part of the standard: “the plaintiff can either show that the 
communications are or may be tortious or show that he has a ‘legitimate, good faith 
basis’ for his belief that the communications are tortious.”316 The court concluded that if 
the anonymous users were not actual customers then the reviews were per se 
defamatory.317 In addition, because Hadeed tried to match up customer records with 
comments, the court found it had met it the “good faith” prong of the law.318  
 Similarly, the third prong of the test was satisfied because Hadeed looked 
through its records to match the reviews with customers. It requested Yelp’s assistance 
only after it could not identify seven users.319 Hadeed passed the fourth prong of the test 
because it needed the identities to advance its defamation claim: “Without the identity 
of the Doe defendants, Hadeed cannot move forward with its defamation lawsuit. There 
is no other option. The identity of the Doe defendants is not only important, it is 
necessary.”320 The court brushed over the fifth and sixth prongs of the test because Yelp 
did not contest them, and the social-networking website admitted that it did have the 
information Hadeed sought.321  
In his dissent, Justice Haley concurred with the use of the Virginia unmasking 
standard.322 However, he did not believe Hadeed had met the statute’s requirements. He 
argued that to satisfy the second prong, the speech needed to be tortious. In this case, 
                                                 
316
 Id. at 27-8.  
317
 Id. at 34.  
318
 Id. at 35.  
319
 Id. at 38. 
320
 Id. at 39. 
321
 Id. at 39-40. 
322
 Id. at 44-5. 
  47 
the commenters needed to state false things about Hadeed; Hadeed did not claim that 
the statements were false but rather, that if the commenters were not customers the 
statements could be defamatory.323 In addition to not meeting the second prong’s first 
requirement, Justice Haley also found Hadeed’s “reasonable efforts” to identify 
customers lacking.324 The company admitted that it would only know whether the 
commenters were customers after they were unmasked.325 Judge Haley argued that 
because Hadeed could not prove the reviewers were not customers, the users’ 
anonymity should remain intact. Hadeed’s claims were “…a self-serving argument - 
one that proceeds from a premise the argument is supposed to prove. If Hadeed were an 
individual, he would be attempting to ‘lift himself by his own bootstraps.’”326  
This argument, along with the failure to prove falsity, compelled Judge Haley to 
assert that the right to anonymity found in both the Constitution of the United States and 
the Virginia Constitution outweighed Hadeed’s right to unmask the commenters.327 “A 
business subject to critical commentary, commentary here not even claimed to be false 
in substance, should not be permitted to force the disclosure of the identity of 
anonymous commentators simply by alleging that those commentators may not be 
customers because they cannot identify them in their database.”328 Determining that 
Hadeed had not properly met the unmasking standards crafted by the state of Virginia, 
Judge Haley believed that the subpoena duces tecum should be quashed.329  
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Though Haley’s dissent seems to support Yelp’s claims, the majority did not 
agree with his views. Unmasking standards differ because courts disagree on how to 
balance the state’s interests against the First Amendment protection of anonymous 
speech.330 The Yelp case highlights how jurisdiction affects online unmasking claims. 
Low standards, such as the good faith showing of merit,331 do not adequately protect 
speech. Differing standards lead to uneven protections for speech across the country, 
which may allow plaintiffs to use the unmasking process as a retribution for disfavored 
expression.332 To that end, the work of communication scholar James Carey illustrates 
the importance of a national standard in anonymous speech cases involving the Internet. 
VI. JAMES CAREY’S MODELS OF COMMUNICATION 
James Carey’s study of the ritual333 and transmission334 models of 
communication can assist in understanding the disruptive nature of the Internet. 
Although these models have different aims and methods, they are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. The best societies engage both models.335 The ritual model is the 
older model that focuses on the creation of meaning:  
communication is linked to terms such as ‘sharing,’ ‘fellowship,’ and ‘the 
possession of a common faith.’… A ritual view of communication is directed 
not toward the extension of messages in space but toward the maintenance of 
society in time; not the act of imparting information but the representation of 
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shared beliefs.336  
 
Carey argues that scholars often overlook this ritual model because the transmission 
model links more closely with underlying American values and beliefs.337 
Carey associates the transmission model with technology and distribution. “It is 
defined by terms such as ‘imparting,’ ‘sending,’ ‘transmitting’ or ‘giving information to 
others.’ It is formed from a metaphor of geography or transportation.”338  Transmission 
communication is rooted in the physical migration of people. A common use of 
communication through this model is to control space by spreading messages across 
vast distances at rapid speeds.339 Initially, transmission was linked to transportation 
through physical movement: people carried written work through space and the pace of 
movement matched human movement.340 This tradition remained until the development 
of the telegraph. Once the telegraph was developed, it split the embodiment from the 
message, which significantly enhanced portability.341 
Carey asserts that both the ritual and transmission models are rooted in religion, 
but that each model deviates from the other in expressing this religious connection.342 
Transmission links to American ideals about communication, redemption, and 
establishing the kingdom of God, “The vast and, for the first time, democratic migration 
in space was above all an attempt to trade an old world for a new and represented the 
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profound belief that movement in space could be in itself a redemptive act. It is a belief 
Americans have never quite escaped.”343  
Though the religious aspect of this model eventually died, the initial tie between 
religion and technology gave expansive communication models the utmost cultural 
standing.344 For this reason, technology that empowers mass dissemination occupies a 
moral high ground in society.345 Ritual communication expresses religion through 
communal access. It is not focused on religious instruction but religious meaning and 
the creation of holy spaces.346   
 Carey argues that ritual communication should be revered but acknowledges that 
both models are essential to the creation of a rich and diverse world.347 Each model 
creates separate symbols, and symbols construct the world in which humans live.348 
How one perceives of and interacts with the world colors personal experiences. 
“Problems of communication are linked to problems of community,”349 because 
communication consists of the daily activities of individual human lives. This 
constructed world needs constant repair to maintain order, and when a former authority 
is destroyed, an entirely new world must be created.350  
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 The tools that create this new world are symbols inherent in both models of 
communication.351 This important duality is often lost on those who wish to view 
communication as one or the other: 
When we think about society, we are almost always coerced into seeing it as a 
network of power, administration, decision, and control—as a political order. 
Alternatively, we have seen society essentially as relations of property, 
production, and trade—an economic order. But social life is more than power 
and trade (and it is more than therapy as well). As Williams has argued it also 
includes the sharing of aesthetic experience, religious ideas, personal values and 
sentiments, and intellectual notions—a ritual order.352  
 
Transmission models create social order and control, and ritual models create the social 
bonds and norms that make the human existence pleasurable.353 Carey argued that 
communications scholars should engage how expression contributes to social order.354 
Perhaps because of this view, Carey did not agree with those who heralded 
technological advancement as the utopian cure for all of society’s ills. He called the 
excited pronouncements of scholars who proclaimed that technology would overcome 
all obstacles to an equal and participatory society the “new manifest destiny.”355  
The Internet is neither a messiah nor a destroyer; it is merely a tool for 
communication. Carey correctly scrutinizes some of the utopian ideals that arose with 
the construction of the Internet. When the Internet first exhibited pervasive and 
innovative promise, many American scholars created utopian ideologies surrounding 
the technology. One significant moment in the conception of legal power on the Internet 
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was in 1996 when Grateful Dead lyricist John Perry Barlow published his Declaration 
of Independence for the Internet.356 In the short essay, Barlow asserted that cyberspace 
was a place separate from the physical world and therefore beyond the reach of the arm 
of the law.357 His essay, a response to the Telecommunications Act of 1996,358 argued 
that legal authority is trussed to geography, and, because cyberspace adheres to no 
physical border, the law cannot influence the speech and conduct that occur in 
cyberspace.359  
When Barlow penned this work, he envisioned cyberspace as a libertarian haven 
where people would be able to freely interact with one another and escape the confines 
of the physical world,360 including embodiment: 
We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice 
accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth… 
Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do 
not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter here. 
Our identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot obtain order by physical 
coercion. We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and the 
commonweal, our governance will emerge. Our identities may be distributed 
across many of your jurisdictions. The only law that all our constituent cultures 
would generally recognize is the Golden Rule.361 
 
Barlow’s separation was a distinction between speech and action that First Amendment 
jurisprudence, at first blush, seems to support.362 However, his work ignored the 
previous rulings of the Court that some speech can be proscribed even though the First 
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Amendment shelters much discourse.363 Barlow’s sweeping description of a general 
freedom to express ideas is powerful, but it overlooked the nuances of human 
interaction. 
 Law professor Lawrence Lessig directly contradicted Barlow’s libertarian 
ideology. Lessig emphasized that all interactions must happen through computers, 
which he believed to be key to regulating online interactions and spaces.364 Using code, 
computers could be programed to regulate behavior very effectively.365 Code could be 
used to create interactive opportunities; code could be used to create the world in which 
users engage. Code represented the architecture of the Internet; which meant that code 
was law.366 
 Lessig argued that two places exist: “the Internet,” which is a place to do things 
like pay bills, write emails, and buy goods, and “cyberspace,” which consists of spaces 
for online communities to create different ways of life.367 Each community has a 
different set of rules and different goals: “Cyberspace is not one place. It is many 
places. And the character of these many places differ in ways that are fundamental.”368 
For some, the idea that a computer-mediated community could exist was an odd idea.369 
Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Mike Godwin argued that scholars who 
promote the First Amendment must be comfortable with the idea of community in an 
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intangible form. For Godwin, the intangible represents the very essence of the First 
Amendment: 
What we call the ‘the First Amendment’ is not something that depends on the 
scribbling of words on a piece of paper or parchment…The rules arise when the 
language, the history, and the underlying principles interact with the material 
world. The world of these abstract, virtual entities and the concrete, tangible, 
material world of cases and controversies are shaping each other constantly.370 
 
In his book, Godwin predicted that libel and defamation suits would not be a major 
factor in cyberspace. Godwin argued that it would always be easier for someone to hit 
the “reply key” than to file a lawsuit.371 However, as the previous section has shown, 
Godwin was wrong. People can and do sue for libel and defamation online.  When 
courts have found that online statements were beyond constitutional protection, they 
have punished the speaker in much the same way they would in terrestrial speech 
cases.372 Some scholars believe that online speech is actually more harmful than offline 
speech because it is more pervasive,373 making it both “amplified and entrenched.”374 
Prior to the Internet, compartmentalizing problematic speech was more feasible.375  
However, because online speech transcends social and geographic borders, victims of 
harmful speech cannot easily segregate harms that occur in cyberspace. Harmful speech 
and actions may leak into the everyday lives of the targets.376 
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This blurring of geographic boundaries has the potential to disrupt the legal 
system. The law historically depended on physical boundaries to impose restrictions on 
individual actors.377 It is no mistake that such rules are often called “the law of the 
land.”378 If a speaker lived and worked in a particular county in a particular state, then 
he was subject to its laws.379 As Lessig pointed out, problems of jurisdiction are not 
new, but the Internet has added an additional level of uncertainty to determining 
jurisdiction.380 “Whenever anyone is in cyberspace, she is also here, in real space. 
Whenever one is subject to the norms of a cyberspace community, one is also living 
within a community in real space.”381  
Carey’s work can help legal scholars understand this jurisdictional conundrum. 
Law, as a means of social control, fits into the transmission model. To regulate 
behavior, the law must be able to control its citizens in establishing and maintaining 
order.382 If citizens are to continue submitting to the authority of the law, they must 
know in advance, what is permissible. As Justice George Sutherland stated in Connally 
v. General Construction Company,383 “a statute which either forbids or requires the 
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due 
process of law.”384  
                                                 
377
 Id. at 226. 
378
 U.S. Const. art. 6. 
379
 Lessig, supra note 372 at 292. 
380
 Id. at 298.  
381
 Id. 
382
 Carey, supra note 241 at 31. 
383
 269 U.S. 385 (1926).  
384
 Id. at 391.  
  56 
Fair notice is an important part of circumventing vagueness; the Court has held 
that lack of fair warning may unjustly punish innocent citizens.385 In First Amendment 
cases, the Court sanctions vagueness with particular fervor.386 Laws regulating speech 
are often evaluated “on their face”387 which is different from other challenges of 
vagueness, which hold that a plaintiff must prove that the law is unconstitutional “as 
applied to him and the circumstances of his case.”388 Law professor Paul A. Fruend, 
argues that such protection safeguards the public interest,  
In order not to chill conduct within the protection of the Constitution and having a 
genuine social utility, it may be necessary to throw the mantle of protection beyond 
the constitutional periphery, where the statute does not make the boundary clear. 
The public interest in freedom of expression may serve to invalidate an overbroad 
statute that casts a cloud on expression both within and without the constitutional 
boundary.389 
 
Vagueness not only provides insufficient notice to guide an individual in his or her 
conduct, but it also inadequately guides judges and juries when making findings of 
fact.390 If a statute fails to clearly articulate prohibited conduct, the law may chill 
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speech.391 Furthermore, the lack of precise legal guidelines decreases uniform 
application, which leaves room for arbitrary judicial decisions.392  
The Internet’s lack of geographic borders exacerbates the issues surrounding proper 
notice and chilling expression. As one scholar argues, “The proper ‘community’ for the 
purpose of the Internet should be one applicable to all users of the Internet”393 as it 
applies to obscenity, so should a single unmasking standard should apply to all 
American users of the Internet.394 Further interaction with James Carey’s scholarship 
will unpack the importance of a national unmasking standard.  
VII. ANALYSIS 
Toward Ritual Order: A National Unmasking Standard 
Further unpacking of Carey’s arguments reveals that technological advancement in 
and of itself is not enough to create a ritual order. Carey examined the work of scholar 
Harold Innis to show that new mechanisms for communication do not always promise 
an idyllic society.395 Carey argued that the dependence on the transmission model in the 
United States led to the lessening of importance, prestige, and the power of local 
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control.396 The technological advancements connected to transmission created 
“centralization of national authority through a uniform code of law”397 among other 
things. The growth of transmission supportive structures created new thoughts and tools 
to think with: 398 
changes in communication technology affected culture by altering the 
structure of interests (the things thought about) by changing the character of 
symbols (the things thought with), and by changing the nature of community 
(the arena in which thought developed)…In the realm of communities that 
were not in place but in space, mobile, connected over vast distances by 
appropriate symbols, forms, and interests.399 
 
This renders previous separating factors, including geography and culture, much 
less powerful.400 Citizens can cross physical and social boundaries to interact with one 
other easily via the Internet. This bypass of traditional confines forces people to rely on 
hyper-centralized systems of power, politics, and culture to bind them together.401 To 
illustrate this point, Carey considered the telegraph and its relationship with the railroad 
to be the first transmission model that significantly altered language, knowledge, and 
“the very structures of awareness.”402 It loosened communication from the constraints 
of physical space, and it instead allowed communication to control physical space, such 
as market price and railroad shipments.403  
Carey also explained how the telegraph created ritual order by melding the 
seemingly opposite goals of “the desire for peace, harmony, and self-sufficiency with 
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the wish for power, power profit and productivity.”404 It also changed the symbols in 
culture by requiring standardization of language so that people across the country could 
understand the information.405  
The telegraph put everyone in the same communicative space. It made geography 
unimportant in the marketplace,406 and it merged markets and prices.407 The telegraph 
and the railroad birthed standardized time.408 Before the railroad emerged, the sun 
marked time, and thus the time was different for every community. According to Carey, 
roughly every thirteen miles marked a minute of time difference.409 As the railroad 
grew, the varying times caused confusion because passengers could not easily 
determine when a train would arrive or depart.410 Ultimately, the United States changed 
to a standardized time which enabled better “coordination of activity and, therefore, 
effective social control.”411  
The power of the telegraph enabled standardized time by creating a method to 
communicate the standardizations,412 but changes were also needed in the physical 
world to eliminate confusion and integrate the new technology into the everyday lives 
of citizens. Carey showed that the history of technological advancement demonstrates 
that transcending geographic borders, in and of itself, is not really a unique property of 
the Internet. Much like the telegraph and railroad propelled the need for standardized 
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time,413 so too does the Internet propel the need for a national standard for unmasking 
anonymous speakers. Though the jurisdictional disputes would not be completely 
remedied by a nationwide test, as Carey’s work explains, such standardization would 
provide a streamlined system that would contribute to social stability and reinforce the 
authority of law.414  
Important Considerations for a Standardized Test 
Lessig asserted that the best way to adapt the traditional law to the Internet is 
through translation. In the context of anonymous online speech, this thesis attempts to 
take “a current reading of the original Constitution that preserves its original meaning in 
the present context.”415 Just as judges should employ translation to decide cases that 
engage constitutional issues, this thesis engages seminal Supreme Court decisions on 
anonymous speech and attempts to translate those opinions into a test that courts can 
use to balance a defendant’s right to speak anonymously online against a plaintiff’s 
right to unmask the speaker. To create a well-balanced test, a basic understanding of 
why the First Amendment protects anonymous and distasteful speech is necessary. 
Understanding the justifications for protection of anonymity will aid translation.  
Why the First Amendment Protects Anonymous Speech 
Anonymous speech is protected because speakers may cloak themselves for 
productive purposes.416 Although the nefarious uses of anonymous speech are realistic 
consequences of protecting speaker identity, the benefits of anonymity outweigh the 
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evils.417 Legal scholar Victoria Ekstrand argues that citizens benefit from anonymity in 
seven ways: as convention, for safety, as rhetoric and identity, for gamemanship, to 
circumvent class and gender, to increase privacy, and to enhance generativity.418 
Convention uses anonymity to speak for and to a certain community; in this model 
anonymity fosters a sense of commonality and collectivity, which makes individual 
authorship less important. This sort of culture and use was much more common before 
the printing press.419   
Safety, as the Court has recognized in Talley and in McIntyre, is an important 
reason to allow anonymous speech. The importance that anonymity played in the 
dissemination of literature spurred support for the American Revolution.420 Anonymity 
protects the speaker from the various repercussions his or her disruptive speech may 
provoke.421 Though modern Americans may not need to worry about the pillory, they 
still have much to fear when speaking their minds: public condemnation, reputation 
bashing, physical threats, and legal actions are viable consequences for contributing to 
unpopular discourse.422 Safety as a positive use of cloaked speech directly links to 
another positive use: privacy. Just as anonymity ensures safety, so it protects the 
delicacies of private life from public speculation. Alcoholics Anonymous and protection 
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for whistleblowers are examples of how anonymity protects privacy for constructive 
reasons.423  
Ekstrand linked rhetoric and identity because anonymity contributes to a 
speaker’s ability to create a collective identity. Cloaking identity may allow a voice of 
dissent to carry more cachet because individual dissatisfactions are easier to dismiss 
than collective dissent.424 Ekstrand argued that the Framers created a national identity 
by interacting anonymously because views become generalizable through the 
suppression of individuality.425 Online communities today use anonymity in the same 
way; according to Ekstrand, “…through the use of code and hacking strategies, online 
coalitions such as Anonymous, create an online identity of resistance.”426 
This stripping of individual identity links to circumventing class and gender.  
Anonymity casts off the physical constraints of the world from words.427 Cyberspace 
held promise to become a space where a true marketplace of ideas could exist.428 Pieces 
of identity such as gender or socio-economic status do not attach themselves to 
anonymous expression on the Internet, which insulates speakers from prejudice and 
enables critique of an idea’s merits rather than of the speaker.429  
Some speakers may choose anonymity because it is fun. The gamemanship 
motivation delights in trickery and may use anonymity for personal promotion. For 
example, the author of Gulliver’s Travels, Jonathan Swift, concealed his identity to 
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generate audience speculation. The gossip created free publicity for his work. Once 
obscurity served its purpose, Swift revealed that he was the author. Ekstrand notes that 
print media audiences have less tolerance for gamemanship today, but online audiences 
are still tolerant of chicanery. 430 
Ekstrand also asserts that anonymity contributes to generativity. Generativity, as 
Johnathan Zittrain describes it, is an Internet-specific ability to “produce unanticipated 
change through unfiltered contribution from broad and varied audiences.”431 It is 
characterized by five elements:  
(1) how extensively a system or technology leverages a set of possible tasks; (2) 
how well it can be adapted to a range of tasks; (3) how easily new contributors 
can master it; (4) how accessible it is to those ready and able to build on it; and 
(5) how transferable any changes are to others—including (and perhaps 
especially) nonexperts.432 
 
In the beginning of his book, Zittrain contrasted the iPhone with the Apple II (a 
personal computer). Although the iPhone was a beautifully designed innovation that 
blended music player and phone functions with Internet access, it did not have the same 
generative capabilities as the Apple II. 433 The Apple II was a “platform,” which users 
could manipulate for various purposes. “It invited people to tinker with it.”434 The 
iPhone on the other hand did not allow people to alter the preprogrammed uses of the 
device.435 Zittrain asserted that although the Apple II was a generative machine the 
iPhone was nothing more than an appliance.436 
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Though Ekstrand noted that anonymity and generativity are linked, other 
scholars such as Bryan Choi, asserted that anonymity must be sacrificed to save 
generativity.437 Choi argued that anonymity, by itself, has good and bad uses, and that 
the Internet, by itself, has noble and wicked uses, but online anonymity merged with ill 
intent can magnify injuries.438 Thus, when anonymity is not constrained, generativity 
suffers.439  
As Choi explains, generativity is a lot like anonymity “The more generative a 
technology is, the more dangerous it can be. By definition, the abuses of generativity 
cannot be separated from the benefits; the freedom to experiment required to produce 
good outcomes necessarily allows bad ones too.”440 Choi harnesses the reticence some 
judges display when they are analyzing online defamation cases.  
The Internet may magnify the harms of anonymity. According to Ekstrand, 
anonymity can cause harm in three ways:  through intimidation, insulation, and the 
incubation of crime and fraud.441 Using anonymity to intimidate or to spread rumor and 
false speech links to the harms of defamation because anonymity shields defamers from 
accountability442 and can facilitate wrongdoing.443  
Though protection of anonymity means that some people will use a mask for 
destructive rather than constructive purposes, the Court has found that the benefits of 
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anonymity outweigh some of the costs.444 For example, anonymous speech facilitates 
the dissemination of dissenting speech and ideas.445 Imbedded in the First Amendment 
is the assumption that a healthy democracy fosters the growth of a wide variety of ideas 
in the public sphere, and, while some thorny weeds may grow beside the flowers, the 
mixing is necessary to cultivate democracy.446 Though often First Amendment 
scholarship focuses on what the government can and cannot do, the First Amendment 
theory of dissent also recognizes that social norms are often as powerful as the law in 
regulating behavior.447   
Why the First Amendment Protects Dissent 
 According to law professor Cass R. Sunstein, social pressure is just as effective 
as the law in regulating citizen behavior because it organically develops and induces 
pressure to conform to majority opinions and to social norms.448 Sunstein asserts that 
two factors and three phenomena influence human behavior.449 The first influencing 
factor is trust of sources such as authority figures and experts.450 The second factor is 
desire for the high regard of others. These two factors lead to conformity, cascades, and 
polarization—the phenomena that directly discourage dissent.451  
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The smaller and more familiar a group is, the higher the pressure to conform.452 
Reputational cascades occur when an individual chooses to agree with the majority to 
protect his high regard in a social circle.453 Close-knit communities severely punish 
those who cause tension, which makes dissent less likely.454 Reputational cascades are 
usually effective on the first handful of dissenters, but, as Sunstein notes, once dissent 
reaches a certain critical mass, the sheer volume of counter-speech deadens the sting to 
individual reputation.455  
An informational cascade occurs when an individual no longer relies on 
personal opinions. 456 Instead, he or she depends on others to direct thoughts and 
actions. This can lead to popularized error.457 Only through dissent are informational 
cascades circumvented.458 The First Amendment grants this freedom, but social 
pressures still push against voicing the unpopular view; this is where anonymity, when 
used for the speaker’s safety from social sanction, evades the trappings of cascades.459 
Dissent increases tension and decreases the strength of social ties.460 Though 
sometimes uncomfortable, dissent cultivates change by weakening these social bonds 
and disrupting social norms.461 Protecting distasteful speech encourages debates, which 
hampers the flourishing of polarization, thereby counteracting the group’s tendency to 
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make extreme decisions.462 Protection of dissent allows communities to “benefit from 
the courage or foolhardiness of those who dissent.”463  
Dissent benefits communities when it is intentional, critical, and public.464 
While these categories may seem straightforward, there is debate about how extreme 
dissent can be. Some scholars argue that harmful speech, like defamation, and even 
harmful acts can be dissent as long as the dissenter accepts the “rule of law,” even if he 
or she does not agree with the punishment.465 That is, “a dissenter may use the system 
of law to change the existing law…” (sic)466 which proves that he or she both respects 
the rule of law and disagree with its current form.  
Other scholars argue that if problematic speech crosses the threshold into 
unlawful action or into the unprotected areas of speech, it is not dissent. True dissent is 
public, intentional, critical, and does not cause harm.467 This view squares with First 
Amendment jurisprudence: dissent, by definition, is sheltered because it does not fit into 
one of the categories considered outside constitutional protection. This is the fine line 
that judges must walk to determine what speech is protected and what speech is not.  
A good standard must be clear enough to guide judges, while leaving room for 
judges to ponder “the precise facts in each situation”468 and rule accordingly. Legal 
scholars have characterized this as the balance between ensuring public safety and 
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fostering the search for truth.469 According to legal scholar Thomas I. Emerson, this 
conflict must be encouraged because it must occur to create longer lasting consensus. It 
is necessary to allow citizens to “disagree with, arouse, antagonize and shock his fellow 
citizens and the government…such an arrangement is hardly likely to be self-operating. 
In its short-term effects it may indeed be highly volatile.”470  
The law provides a balance that validates and unifies the system. It must delay 
instant gratification to reap enduring gains. To be effective, legal rules must be clear 
and specific because “doubt or uncertainty negates the process.”471 At the same time, 
judges must create a “series of compromises”472 that could hamper the clarity of law, 
unless grounded in a strong theory of the First Amendment values such as protection of 
dissent. To create clear standards, judges must have a clear conception of what the First 
Amendment protects and why freedom of speech is protected.473 Legal scholar Steven 
H. Shriffin argues that justifications for protecting speech are rooted in a romantic 
understanding of the First Amendment that valued nonconformity above all else:  
They celebrated the courage of the nonconformist, the iconoclast, the dissenter. 
In urging self-reliance and independence of thought, in praising the heroism of 
those willing to speak out against the tide, they sided with the romantics—those 
willing to break out of classical forms. Their conception of democracy had little 
to do with voting and everything to do with American spirit. They sided with 
John Stewart Mill, in recognizing the ease of conformity. And, with Mill, they 
sponsored nonconformity.474 
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Judges must not only consider the values underlying the rulings of each individual case 
but also, and perhaps most importantly, the underlying ideology to decode the prongs of 
tests that engage the tenuous balance demanded by First Amendment law.475  
A Proper Unmasking Standard 
The long string of cases outlined in this thesis also show that the First 
Amendment protection afforded anonymous speech should only be removed if the state 
has an overriding476 or compelling477 interest to do so. Historically, the Court has 
prohibited restrictions on speech simply deemed distasteful.478 It is important to note 
that unmasking, though perhaps unavoidable in the Internet age, exceeds the normal 
post-publication punishment for defamation.479As Judge Jensen noted in 
SeesCandy.com, prior to the proliferation of the Internet, such discovery methods were 
limited to criminal investigations.480 Furthermore, as one scholar explains, when the 
court unmasks a speaker it is “compelling the anonymous individual to speak his or her 
identity”481 which interferes with the individual’s freedom of speech. Therefore, an 
appropriate standard for unmasking speakers on the Internet must tip the balance in 
favor of the First Amendment. 
Many of the current tests employed by courts have similar standards that require 
notice, merits, and identifying statements. However, not all of the tests are created 
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equal. Tests such as the Virginia statute used in Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning482 tip 
the scales in the plaintiff’s favor. The good faith standard merely requires a plaintiff to 
show that a cause of action may exist to justify the unmasking of a defendant.483 An 
appropriate standard must require that the speech be outside First Amendment 
protection before removing the speaker’s cloak of anonymity. Of course, merely 
considering the speech itself is not enough. Judges must also examine the context in 
which speech occurs484 to design standards that appropriately weigh competing 
interests.485 
Therefore, a proper national would mirror the Dendrite standard with one 
important modification to the burden of proof. The first prong, notice, gives anonymous 
speakers time to contest the subpoena should they wish to do so. The Dendrite court 
considered notice served if the plaintiff posted the information on the same medium the 
anonymous speaker used, “For example, if the message at issue was sent via email, the 
requesting party must make the notification via a response to the email or separate email 
to the anonymous sender's address.”486 Further, plaintiffs must wait a substantial 
amount of time before moving forward, which gives the defendant an opportunity to file 
a motion to quash.487 
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Second, the standard should require that the plaintiff identify the exact 
statements that he or she claim are tortious in context.488 Again, because unmasking 
goes beyond traditional punishment for defamation,489 and because the First 
Amendment protects anonymity,490 courts must ensure statements do not warrant 
constitutional protection before unmasking speakers. This prong gives courts a chance 
to determine whether the words are actionable (assertions of fact) or opinion by 
considering the context.  
Third, plaintiffs must show that they have a legitimate claim. This prong ensures 
that courts only revoke anonymous speech rights if claims against the speakers are 
substantial. It will help prevent plaintiffs from using discovery as retribution. Plaintiffs 
should use the court system to obtain lawful remedy and not to “…harass, intimidate, or 
retaliate.”491   
Fourth, plaintiffs must support each cause of action with convincing evidence of 
harm.492 In a defamation case, the court must consider whether plaintiffs are public 
figures or private figures.  If the court determines that the party is a private figure, then 
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the plaintiff must create prima facie case and withstand a motion to dismiss.493 If the 
court determines the party is a public figure, then the plaintiff must satisfy the summary 
judgment standard, such as the one in Cahill,494  to warrant unmasking. This two-tier 
approach properly considers defamation jurisprudence, which has determined that 
public figures495 must meet a higher burden of proof to win defamation cases.496   
If discovery is not linked to a lawsuit, where the plaintiff must prove actual 
malice the original Dendrite prong applies. The plaintiff must make a prima facie 
showing that withstands a motion to dismiss. This standard may not be as stringent a 
protection as the summary judgment standard in Cahill,497 but it is the right choice for a 
test that evaluates a variety of claims. As the AutoAdmit.com case shows, online 
anonymity can shield wrongdoers whose actions warrant unmasking.498 The prima 
facie/motion to dismiss prong, coupled with the balancing prong of the Dendrite test, 
allows judges to weigh the competing interests in each case.   
Finally, the balancing prong allows judges to compare the defendant’s right to 
remain anonymous against the strength of the case.499 This prong is important because 
not all cases have the same set of facts. In the case of defamation, public officials500 and 
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public figures have a different burden of proof than private plaintiffs.501 Furthermore, 
the First Amendment may not protect defamation when statements are made with actual 
malice502 but political speech traditionally enjoys the highest level of First Amendment 
protection.503 This part of the test allows judges to consider other important factors that 
may apply to the case such as the consequences of an unmasking, whether identifying 
the speaker is needed to advance the claim, and whether other discovery options are 
available.504 In Yelp, Hadeed would have failed to meet Dendrite test because it did not 
argue that the comments were themselves false statements of fact. Instead, it argued that 
if the users were not customers, then the posts were likely defamatory.505 There, the 
comments were not considered on their own merits.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
A proposed national test solidifies First Amendment protection for anonymous 
speech online by considering the context and content of speech. Implementing a 
uniform test for unmasking anonymous commenters would provide legal stability that is 
not dependent upon technology but instead looks to the core principles that support free 
expression. Anonymity, in itself, is not always harmful either online or off-line,506 and it 
should continue to enjoy robust constitutional protection.507 The Court has recognized 
that cloaking has productive uses and may be used to fruitfully counter majority’s 
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views.508 Dissent theory shows the important role anonymity plays in the democratic 
process,509 a role that has many societal benefits.510  
A national test would also alleviate some of the current jurisdictional issues that 
arise when courts address speech on the Internet. Tests that do not properly weigh the 
importance of protecting masked speakers place First Amendment rights in peril and 
also impede the due process of law. The ruling in Yelp v. Hadeed shows that some 
unmasking standards currently in use currently tip the balance in favor of plaintiffs.  
Of course, the right to anonymity is not absolute, and courts can rescind 
anonymity if it insulates those who utter words beyond the scope of First Amendment 
protections.511 Appropriate tests must balance the needs of society against the 
individual’s constitutional right to anonymity.  A national unmasking standard, such as 
the one outlined above, would help ensure that courts correctly strike this balance in 
future cases.  
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